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COMMENTS
THE NBA GETS A COLLEGE
EDUCATION: AN ANTITRUST AND
LABOR ANALYSIS OF THE NBA's
MINIMUM AGE LIMIT
"Would you deny someone like Tiger Woods, Alex Rodriguez or
Venus and Serena Williams the chance to turn pro and earn a living
before turning 20? No, because we live in America, and the right to
do what you desire is one of the great gifts we have in this country.
It's all about freedom, man!"
- Dick Vitale
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Kevin Garnett became the first basketball player drafted
straight out of high school by a National Basketball Association
(NBA) team in twenty years. 2 Professional scouts, coaches, and man-
agement considered Garnett a rare talent, possessing the physical ma-
turity and skills necessary to begin playing professional basketball in
the NBA immediately after graduating from high school. 3 Most
American-born players are drafted only after playing in college,
where they mature physically and mentally. Since 1995, however, the
number of high school players drafted into the NBA has dramatically
increased.4 Some of those drafted, such as Garnett, excelled in the
Dick Vitale, Don't Keep Best High Schoolers Out of NBA, ESPN.COM, Apr. 26, 2005,
http://espn.go.com/dickvitale/vcolumnO50425-ageplan.html.
2 Andy Katz, CBA Discussions Coming Later This Summer, ESPN.CoM, June 24, 2004,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/draft2004/news/story?id=l 827134.
3 Jack McCallum, Hoop Dream; Kevin Garnett, A Sure-Shot Lottery Pick, Is Jumping
From High School to the NBA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 26, 1995, at 64.
4 See Katz, supra note 2.
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NBA, while others failed miserably and disappeared from the league. 5
To be eligible for the NBA draft during this period, an American
player's high school class must have graduated; for foreign players,
they must have turned eighteen prior to the draft. The NBA, however,
made it clear in 2004 that it wanted to set a minimum age of twenty
for draft eligibility.
6
The NBA is a unionized league, with its players represented by the
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA).7 The NBA and
NBPA negotiate terms of employment and memorialize those terms
in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); periodically, that CBA
expires and is renegotiated. The NBA and NBPA negotiated a new
CBA in 2005, with the NBA's proposed age limit being the most con-
troversial and debated issue. The final agreement contained a new
minimum age limit of nineteen, or one year removed from high
school graduation.8 This came on the heels of an antitrust suit against
the National Football League (NFL) claiming the NFL's minimum
age limit constituted a group boycott. In Clarett v. National Football
League, the Second Circuit upheld the NFL's minimum age limit by
granting the league antitrust immunity under the narrow nonstatutory
labor exemption.9 The NBA will similarly depend on the nonstatutory
labor exemption if its minimum age limit faces an antitrust challenge.
This Comment looks at the historical relationship between antitrust
law and the NBA and examines how the NBA's minimum age limit
fares under antitrust scrutiny and the application of the nonstatutory
labor exemption. Part I introduces the principles of antitrust law, the
nonstatutory labor exemption, and the methods for analyzing antitrust
claims and applying the nonstatutory labor exemption. Part II dis-
cusses some of the relevant antitrust claims filed against professional
basketball leagues, providing an analogy for potential future claims
5 See Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High
School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 143-59 (2004) (providing
an arguably generous classification of the success, or lack thereof, of players entering the NBA
straight from high school); Michael Lee, Pro Ball Calls, Not All Ready; Commissioner Tries To
Slow High School Flow into NBA, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 20, 2004, at 1E (providing a brief
comment on the success or failure of every high school player entering the league since 1995).
6 Chad Ford, Agents, Advisors Tell Teens To Declare, ESPN.COM, Mar. 26, 2004,
http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/story?id=l 768727.
7 See NBPA History, http://www.nbpa.com/history.php (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
8 The pertinent provision of the agreement states that a player shall be eligible for the en-
try draft when "[tihe player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar year in
which the Draft is held, and (B) with respect to a player who is not an international player [...],
at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since the player's graduation from high school (or, if
the player did not graduate from high school, since the graduation of the class with which the
player would have graduated had he graduated from high school)." NBA-NBPA Collective
Bargaining Agreement, art. X, § I (b)(i) (2005).
9 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728 (2005).
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against the NBA. Part III examines the recent district and appellate
court decisions arising from Maurice Clarett's antitrust lawsuit
against the NFL challenging the league's eligibility rule. Part IV ex-
plores the negotiations between the NBA and NBPA and analyzes the
NBA's new minimum age limit under antitrust law and the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption. This Comment concludes that the NBA's
minimum age limit should be protected from an antitrust challenge by
the nonstatutory labor exemption.
I. ANTITRUST AND THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION
A. Antitrust and Professional Sports
Section I of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combina-
tion, or conspiracy in the restraint of trade or commerce among the
states. 10 The Supreme Court noted that literal interpretation of the
statute prohibits every restraint of trade, so the Court limited the Act's
application to "unreasonable" restraints.' There are three analytical
methods for determining the reasonableness of restraints: the rule of
reason, per se illegal, and the "quick look."
1. The Rule of Reason
The rule of reason is the primary method of determining whether a
restraint is reasonable. The rule of reason requires a court to find three
factors for an antitrust violation: an actual agreement or conspiracy
between competitors, the challenged restraint's adverse effect on or
threat to competition in the relevant market, and that the anticompeti-
tive effects of the restraint outweigh any pro-competitive justifica-
tions for the restraint.'
2
After a plaintiff proves the existence of an agreement, the second
step requires a plaintiff to define the relevant market and show that
the challenged action has an adverse effect on that market. The rele-
vant market has two components: the product market and the geo-
graphic market. The product market is generally made up of products
that are not only alike but reasonably interchangeable. 3 The product
in professional sports leagues is the services of the players, who are
the sellers, and those services are bought by the teams. 14 The geo-
10 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
1 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,86-92 (1911).
12 Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239-41 (1918).
13 United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
4 McCann, supra note 5, at 203 (citing E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 30 (1988)).
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graphic market is the market in which a seller operates and a pur-
chaser can look for the product.15 A plaintiff alleging a group boycott,
a typical claim arising from restraints in professional sports, must
allege injury to the individual as well as to competition as a whole in
the relevant market.' 6 The plaintiff must also show that the defendant
possesses "market power," that is, the "power to control prices or
exclude competition."'17 The third step requires the court to balance
the anticompetitive effects of the restraint with the pro-competitive
justifications asserted by the defendant. Finally, if the court deter-
mines that the justifications outweigh the harmful effects, it must de-
termine whether less restrictive means are available to accomplish the
restraint's objective. If less restrictive means are available, the re-
straint may be found illegal.
2. Per Se Illegal
Some restraints, however, are deemed to have such predictable and
pernicious anticompetitive effect that they are deemed per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act.' 8 The plaintiff must only show that a per se
practice occurred and does not need to prove the unreasonableness of
the restraint or define the relevant market and market power. Courts
generally consider group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal to be
per se violations, although the trend is shifting away from per se and
towards rule of reason.' 9
There are some exceptions to practices that are normally consid-
ered per se violations. One pertinent exception arose from the Su-
preme Court's ruling in NCAA v. Board of Regents recognizing that
some industries have unique characteristics requiring the use of trade
restraints in order to maintain the industry's existence.20 Within these
industries, restraints that are normally per se illegal are analyzed us-
ing the rule of reason. The NCAA Court found that the NCAA (Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association) is "an industry in which hori-
zontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
'5 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
16 Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2004).
17 DuPont, 351 U.S. at 391.
18 N. Pacific v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate
inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."). Practices
constituting per se violations include group boycotts, price fixing, market division, and tying
arrangements. Id.
,9 Id.; Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (stating that "[g]roup
boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal ... have long been held to be in the forbidden category").
20 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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available at all.",2' The Court relied on one commentator's analysis of
restraints on competition in sports leagues:
[S]ome activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the
leading example is league sports. When a league of profes-
sional lacrosse teams is formed, it would be pointless to de-
clare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there are no
22
other professional lacrosse teams.
Professional sports teams must mutually agree upon rules, thereby
restraining the manner in which they compete.23 Although these re-
straints may seem anticompetitive, the sports industry requires mutual
agreements to preserve the integrity of the product and the restraints
are viewed as pro-competitive because the preservation of the indus-
try benefits consumers and athletes.24
3. "Quick Look" Analysis
The NCAA decision contributed to the emergence of an abbrevi-
ated or "quick look" analysis.25 The quick look analysis is used when
a restraint is not per se unlawful, but is sufficiently anticompetitive on
its face that a full rule of reason analysis is not necessary. This allows
a court to avoid the elaborate industry analysis required by the rule of
reason. 26 The analysis presumes that the restraint is unreasonable. To
rebut this presumption, a defendant must explain the reason for the
restraint and illustrate that it is not anticompetitive. The burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to show the anticompetitive effect. If that is
demonstrated, the burden shifts back to the defendant to prove that
there is an adequate pro-competitive justification for the restraint.27
Courts are becoming more reluctant to consider group boycotts per se
illegal, particularly in sports leagues, and are using the rule of reason
or quick look analysis.28 In the Clarett case, for example, Clarett and
21 Id. at 101.
22 Id. (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978)).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 102.
25 See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999) (noting that NCAA
contributed to "what has come to be called abbreviated or 'quick-look' analysis").
26 Id.
27 Id. at 769-71.
28 See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2004) ("The Supreme Court has signaled its intent to move group boycotts off the short list of
per se unreasonable conduct." (citing FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59
(1986); Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294
(1985); Kor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959))).
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the NFL agreed that the rule of reason applied because the restraint
arose in a sports league.29
B. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
Congress enacted labor statutes in an effort to prevent judicial use
of antitrust law to resolve labor disputes.30 Nonstatutory labor exemp-
tions to antitrust law come from the Clayton Act, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, and the National Labor Relations Act.3 ' The nonstatu-
tory labor exemption grew out of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of these statutes, which set forth a policy favoring free and private
collective bargaining and requiring good faith bargaining over wages,
hours, and conditions of employment with rulemaking and interpre-
tive authority delegated to the National Labor Relations Board. 2 The
exemption arose from interpretations "limiting an antitrust court's
authority to determine, in the area of industrial conflict, what is or is
not a 'reasonable' practice."33 The exemption "substitutes legislative
and administrative labor-related determinations for judicial antitrust-
related determinations" regarding the limits of industrial conflict.
3 4
Labor law and collective bargaining would be ineffective if some
restraints on competition were not shielded from antitrust law.35 The
nonstatutory labor exemption protects the national labor law scheme
from being "virtually destroyed" by the routine imposition of antitrust
penalties upon parties engaged in collective bargaining.36 Labor law
often welcomes anticompetitive agreements while antitrust law for-
bids them. As a result, the nonstatutory labor exemption insulates
parties engaged in collective bargaining over wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment from judicial antitrust inquisitions. Allowing
antitrust courts to intrude on the collective bargaining relationships
"place[s] in jeopardy some of the potentially beneficial labor-related
effects that multiemployer bargaining can achieve." 37 The Eighth and
Second Circuits differ on how to apply the nonstatutory labor exemp-
29 Id.
30 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
31 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-37 (2005); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15
(2005); National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2005).
32 Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-37.
33 Id. (citing Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 709-10 (1965)).
3 Id. at 237 (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 709-10).
35 Id. (finding that to "give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaning-
ful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed through the
bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions").
36 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 711.
37 Brown, 518 U.S. at 241.
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tion, while the Supreme Court declined to adopt a specific test for its
application.38
1. The Mackey Test
The Eighth Circuit formulated its test for the nonstatutory labor
exemption in Mackey v. National Football League.39 The plaintiff
professional football players in Mackey claimed the NFL violated the
Sherman Act by imposing the Rozelle Rule, which restricted the
movement of players between teams. The players argued that the rule
constituted an illegal combination and restraint of trade among teams
by denying professional football players the right to freely contract
for their services. 40 The district court agreed, finding that the non-
statutory labor exemption did not protect the NFL because the Ro-
zelle Rule did not arise from collective bargaining.4'
In affirming the district court's decision, the Eighth Circuit exam-
ined the relationship between labor and antitrust law, including the
Supreme Court's decisions recognizing the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion. From this, the court fashioned a three-pronged analysis for ap-
plying the exemption: First, the restraint must primarily affect only
the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, it must
be a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Third, it must arise
out of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.42
The Mackey court found that although the Rozelle satisfied the
first two prongs of the analysis, the exemption did not apply because
the NFL did not show the rule to be a product of bona fide arm's
length negotiating. 43 The court applied the rule of reason and found
that the Rozelle Rule unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the
Sherman Act.44 The court rejected the NFL's pro-competitive justifi-
cations: competitive balance in the league, the investment made by
NFL teams in scouting and drafting, the quality of play in the NFL,
and the financial well-being of the NFL and its teams.45 The Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, along with the district court in Clarett, adopted the
38 See Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
39 543 F.2d 606.
40 Id. at 609.
41 Id
42 Id. at 611-12, 614. (noting Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union
No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965)).
43 Id. at 615-16.
44 Id. at 622.
45 Id. at 621.
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Eighth Circuit's Mackey test, but it is not the only method for deter-
mining the application of the nonstatutory labor exemption.46
2. The Second Circuit's Criteria for the Exemption
The Second Circuit, disagreeing with the Mackey test, uses a dif-
ferent, less rigid analysis in applying the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion. The Second Circuit's latest application of the nonstatutory labor
exemption occurred in Clarett v. National Football League. In
Clarett, the court explicitly rejected the Mackey test and declared that
"the suggestion that the Mackey factors provide the proper guideposts
... simply does not comport with the Supreme Court's most recent
treatment of the nonstatutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc.'
7
The Second Circuit does not follow a defined test, but rather relies
on balancing the conflicting policies embodied in labor and antitrust
law, with labor law policies serving as the first point of reference.48 In
cases involving professional sports with collective bargaining, the
court's threshold question is whether subjecting the issue to antitrust
scrutiny would "subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policy."49 In practice, the Second Circuit applies the exemption when
the restraint arises from a collective bargaining relationship, affects
only the parties to that relationship, and is a mandatory subject of
bargaining.50
3. The Supreme Court's Application in Brown v. Pro Football
The Supreme Court declined to adopt a specific test for applying
the nonstatutory labor exemption when it considered the exemption's
bearing on the NFL's collective bargaining relationship in Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.51 The Brown Court stated that it did not interpret
the exemption as broadly as the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, which "interpreted the labor laws as 'waiving anti-trust liability
for restraints on competition imposed through the collective-
bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a
46 Cont'l Maritime of S.F., Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, Metal Trades
Dept., AFL-CIO, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193
(6th Cir. 1979); Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 405 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2004).
47 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134.
48 Local 210, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Labor Relations Div. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am., 844 F.2d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
49 Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987); Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66
F.3d 523, 527 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
50 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 136-38.
5' Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
[Vol. 56:3
THE NBA GETS A COLLEGE EDUCATION
labor market characterized by collective bargaining.',, 52 The Court
recognized the importance of protecting the collective bargaining
process from the inquiries of antitrust courts, as this is "the very result
that the implicit nonstatutory labor exemption seeks to avoid.,5 3 The
Court noted the tension between labor and antitrust law; while anti-
trust law prohibits almost all unreasonable restraints of trade, labor
law "sometimes welcomes anticompetitive agreements conducive to
industrial harmony. 54
The Brown Court rejected the players' four proposals for limiting
the exemption. The first proposal argued that the exemption should
only apply to actual CBAs, but the Court stated that this did not re-
flect the rationale of the exemption. The second proposal argued that
the exemption should terminate at the point of the impasse in negotia-
tions or a reasonable time thereafter. The Court disagreed, finding
that labor law permits employers to "engage in considerable joint
behavior" after impasse, including lockouts, replacement hiring, ne-
gotiating separate agreements with the union, implementing the final
offer, or maintaining the status quo.55 The third proposal, also rejected
by the Court, would exempt a "postimpasse agreement about bargain-
ing 'tactics,' but not [a] postimpasse agreement about substantive
'terms.' ' 56 The fourth proposal argued that professional sports are
"special" in respect to labor law's antitrust exemption.57 While ac-
knowledging that professional sports depend on a degree of coopera-
tion to survive, the Court found that to be an irrelevant distinction for
fashioning a special labor law exemption from antitrust liability.58
The nonstatutory labor exemption covered the NFL's conduct in
Brown because the conduct "took place during and immediately after
a collective-bargaining negotiation," related to and grew out of "the
lawful operation of the bargaining process," involved a subject "that
the parties were required to negotiate collectively," and "concerned
only parties to the collective-bargaining relationship. '59 The nonstatu-
tory labor exemption does not protect all such agreements; rather, the
Court stated that "an agreement among employers could be suffi-
ciently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would
52 Id. at 235 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996)).
53 Id. at 240-41.
54Id. at 24 1.
5 Id. at 245.
56 Id at 247.
57 Id at 248.
58 Id. at 248-49.
59 Id. at 250.
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not significantly interfere with that process., 60 The Court declined to
decide where "to draw the line," acquiescing to Congress's intent to
leave that decision to the National Labor Relations Board.61 The
Brown Court's decision not to adopt the Mackey test or to define the
boundaries of the exemption casts doubt on whether the Mackey test
is the appropriate means of determining the applicability of the non-
statutory labor exemption.
II. ANTITRUST AND PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATIONS
"My position is to let in anybody who is good enough to play. ,62
- Spencer Haywood
A. Haywood and the NBA
The NBA is no stranger to players challenging its eligibility re-
quirements under the Sherman Act. Spencer Haywood brought the
first antitrust challenge to an NBA eligibility rule in 1971 .63 At the
time, the NBA required that an amateur must be four years removed
from high school prior to entering the league's draft.64 The NBA insti-
tuted the bylaw as a self regulatory measure, not as part of a CBA
with the NBPA.65
Haywood attempted to enter the NBA three years following his
graduation from high school.66 The NBA Commissioner rejected
Haywood's contract, so Haywood filed a claim against the NBA seek-
ing a preliminary injunction allowing him to enter the league. The
claim asserted that the NBA eligibility bylaw constituted a group
boycott by the NBA and its member teams in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.67 The district court granted Haywood's motion,
finding a "substantial probability" that the NBA eligibility bylaw con-
stituted a group boycott, a per se violation of the Sherman Act.68 The
Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction, but Supreme Court Justice Doug-
6 Id.
61 Id. (expressing its reluctance to set guidelines "without the detailed views of the [Na-
tional Labor Relations] Board, to whose 'specialized judgment' Congress 'intended to leave'
many of the 'inevitable questions concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the
future' (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957))).
62 Milan Simonich, Young Pros Owe Spencer Haywood Large Vote of Thanks,
PIrSBURGH POST-GAZET-rE, Nov. 28, 2003, at C-1.
63 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
64 Id. at 1060.
65 Id. at 1059.
66 Id. at 1052, 1054.
67 Id. at 1054, 1057, 1059-60.
68 Id. at 1056.
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las reinstated it.69 Justice Douglas distinguished professional basket-
ball from professional baseball, as baseball enjoys greater exemption
from antitrust law than other sports as a result of Supreme Court rul-
ings and congressional protection.7 °
On remand, the district court determined that the NBA bylaws vio-
lated the Sherman Act.71 The court found that the Act applied because
the NBA engaged in interstate commerce and the agreement between
teams constituted a sufficient contract and combination.72 The court
began by describing that the exception to per se group boycott analy-
sis carved out by Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,73 applied when:
there is a legislative mandate for self-regulation within the industry;
the collective action is intended to accomplish an end consistent with
the policy justifying self-regulation, is reasonably related to that goal,
and is no more restrictive than necessary; and the association provides
procedural safeguards to assure that the restraint is not arbitrary and
to furnish the basis for judicial review.74 The Denver Rockets court
found that the NBA eligibility bylaw failed the second and third
prongs of Silver: the bylaw was overly broad in light of the proffered
goals and there were no procedural safeguards enabling a player to
petition the NBA.75
The court concluded by examining the justifications for the eligi-
bility rule. The NBA contended that the purpose of the bylaws re-
moved the restraints from normal antitrust coverage.7 6 The NBA ar-
gued that the bylaw was "financially necessary to professional
basketball as a business enterprise" and "necessary to guarantee that
each prospective basketball player will be given the opportunity to
complete four years of college prior to beginning his professional
basketball career., 77 Haywood suggested that the rule enabled the
NBA to use college to efficiently train young basketball players with-
out having to pay the costs associated with creating its own minor
league system. 78 According to the court, none of the NBA's justifica-
69 Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
70 See Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that the business
of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball players was
not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953) (declining to overrule Federal Baseball Club absent congressional action).
71 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1067.
72 Id. at 1062.
73 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
74 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp at 1064-65.
75 Id. at 1066.
76 Id.
77 Id
78 Id.
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tions provided a basis for antitrust exemption.79 Following the ruling,
the NBA created a hardship rule which allowed players demonstrating
an economic hardship to circumvent the eligibility requirements and
enter the league as early as their graduation from high school.
B. Wood, Williams, Caldwell, and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
1. Leon Wood and the NBA
Leon Wood filed suit against the NBA and its member teams in
1984 following the league's draft. 80 The league's CBA imposed a
salary cap for teams, and the team that drafted Wood, the Philadelphia
76ers, did not have enough cap room to offer Wood a long-term con-
tract at a salary comparable to other draft picks.8' Wood sought a pre-
liminary injunction restraining enforcement of the CBA so that he
could negotiate with teams other than Philadelphia, which under the
agreement controlled exclusive rights to sign Wood. Wood argued
that the salary cap and draft provisions were the product of an agree-
ment among the NBA teams, as horizontal competitors, to eliminate
competition for the services of college basketball players, constituting
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.83 The district court found that
the challenged provisions of the CBA were shielded from antitrust
liability by the nonstatutory labor exemption.84 The court relied on the
fact that the provisions affected "only the parties to the collective
bargaining agreement-the NBA and the players-involve mandatory
subjects of bargaining as defined by federal labor laws, and are the
result of bona fide arm's-length negotiations. 85
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption. The court acknowledged that the chal-
lenged provisions would have been illegal had they been "agreed
upon by the NBA teams in the absence of a collective bargaining rela-
tionship"; however, their embodiment within a CBA exempted them
from antitrust scrutiny.86 The court discussed the nature of profes-
sional sports as a business and professional sports teams as employers
and the necessary arrangements specific to CBAs in sports and other
industries:
79 Id.
80 Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
81 Wood, 809 F.2d at 958.
82 Id.
83 Wood, 809 F.2d at 958.
84 Wood, 602 F. Supp. at 528.
85 Id.
86 Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
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The issues of free agency and entry draft are at the center of
collective bargaining in much of the professional sports in-
dustry. It is to be expected that the parties will arrive at
unique solutions to these problems in the different sports both
because sports generally differ from the industrial model and
because each sport has its own peculiar economic impera-
tives. The NBAiNBPA agreement is just such a unique bun-
87dle of compromises.
The court also rejected Wood's claim that he fell outside of the bar-
gaining unit as a potential employee, citing several cases determining
that potential or prospective employees are included within the defini-
tion of employee in a bargaining relationship. 88 The court ruled in
favor of the NBA "because no one seriously contends that the anti-
trust laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our fed-
eral labor policy.
89
2. Charles Williams and the NBA
In NBA v. Williams, the Second Circuit addressed the application
of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the bargaining relationship
between the NBA and NBPA once the CBA expired.9° Charles Wil-
liams and a class of players asserted that by continuing its imposition
of the salary cap, right of first refusal, and draft provisions of the
CBA after its expiration, the NBA teams acted as a cartel and com-
mitted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.91 The NBA countered
that, in the absence of an agreement, it merely maintained the status
quo and the nonstatutory labor exemption protected its policies.
The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that Congress never intended
the antitrust laws to subvert multiemployer bargaining and that the
Supreme Court upheld multiemployer bargaining "on the ground that
Congress expressly considered its propriety and resolved that it
87 Id. at 961.
88 Id. at 960 (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that
job applicants are employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v.
NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959) (finding that job applicants are employees); John Han-
cock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (finding that job appli-
cants are employees); Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 143
N.L.R.B. 409, 412, enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965) ("'[E]mployment' connotes the
initial act of employing as well as the consequent state of being employed.")); see also McCann,
supra note 5, at 197-98 (discussing how courts interpret "employee" to include potential em-
ployees in the bargaining unit and how collective bargaining is allowed to adversely affect the
employment conditions of prospective employees).
89 Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
90 NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
91 Id. at 687.
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
should be allowed., 92 The court agreed with the Eight Circuit's hold-
ing that the nonstatutory labor exemption "precluded an antitrust chal-
lenge to various terms and conditions of employment implemented
after impasse" in a collective bargaining session following expiration
of a previous agreement.93 In so agreeing, the court noted "that appli-
cation of antitrust principles to a collective bargaining relationship
would disrupt collective bargaining as we know it."
94
3. Joe Caldwell and the ABA
In 1995, the Second Circuit again relied on the nonstatutory labor
exemption to bar antitrust claims against the American Basketball
Association (ABA).95 Joe Caldwell had a contract dispute with his
team that ultimately led to his lawsuit against the league. Caldwell
asserted that the ABA and its teams participated in a group boycott or
a concerted refusal to deal.96 In dismissing Caldwell's claim, the dis-
trict court did not find a concerted refusal to deal, but made a finding
of fact that Caldwell did not receive another offer from an ABA team
because of his recent history of injuries and decline in ability.97 The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that it
would presume such conduct to be illegal absent the presence of a
collective bargaining relationship, but that in this case, the claims
98
were barred by the exemption. According to the court, "Caldwell's
antitrust claims would 'subvert fundamental principles of federal la-
bor policy."' 99 The court, therefore, applied the exemption and dis-
missed Caldwell's claims under the same reasoning it expressed in
Wood and Williams.
III. MAURICE CLARETT AND THE NFL
The NFL recently successfully defended its eligibility rules in
Clarett v. NFL.100 The NFL rule effectively requires that a player
seeking entry into the league be at least three years removed from the
graduation of his high school class.' 01 Clarett challenged the rule on
92 Id. at 691 (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen Case),
353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957)).
93 Id. at 692-93 (citing Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989)).
94 Id. at 693.
95 Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 825 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 66 F.3d
523 (2d Cir. 1995).
96 Id. at 564.
97 Id. at 570.
98 Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 527.
99 Id. (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
100 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
101 Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y.), rev"d in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d
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antitrust grounds. The district court concluded that the nonstatutory
labor exemption did not shield the rule from antitrust laws and that
the rule violated the Sherman Act. 0 2 The Second Circuit disagreed,
applying the nonstatutory labor exemption. 0 3 These rulings represent
the most recent and accurate analogies to a potential challenge to the
NBA's age limit under antitrust and labor law.
A. The District Court Sacks the NFL 's Eligibility Rule
Clarett sought entry into the NFL approximately two years follow-
ing the graduation of his high school class.' °4 Clarett wanted to enter
the NFL after two seasons at Ohio State University. Clarett played his
freshman year but sat out his sophomore year as a result of an NCAA
and university imposed suspension. Because Clarett did not meet the
NFL's eligibility requirements, he sued, claiming that that rule consti-
tuted a group boycott in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.105
The district court began by considering whether the nonstatutory
labor exemption shielded the eligibility rule from antitrust law using
the Mackey test.'0 6 The court first determined that the rule did not
address a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, thus failing the
second prong of the Mackey test. 10 7 The court stated that the rule did
not mention wages, hours, or conditions of employment, and its effect
made a class of potential players unemployable. 10 8 Because the rule
related to the unemployable class of players and not those who were
employed or eligible for employment, the court found that it did not
concern wages, hours, and conditions of employment in the NFL. 0 9
In the court's view, the rule also failed Mackey's first prong be-
cause it "only affects players, like Clarett, who are complete strangers
to the bargaining relationship."'" 0 Although the nonstatutory labor
exemption applies to potential employees, the court distinguished
Clarett's situation because the rule excluded him from employment.
The court stated that because "those who are categorically denied
eligibility for employment, even temporarily, cannot be bound by the
124 (2d Cir. 2004).
02 Id. at 410.
103 Clarett, 369 F.3d 124.
104 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388 n.55.
105 Id. at 390.
106Id. at 391.
1°01d. at 393.
108 Id.
19Id.
1Old. at 395.
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terms of employment they cannot obtain," the exemption cannot ap-
ply to the NFL's eligibility rule."'
Finally, the court found that the NFL's eligibility rule also failed
Mackey's third prong. The NFL's CBA did not contain the eligibility
rule; it existed only in the NFL Bylaws." 2 Although the CBA refer-
enced the NFL's Constitution and Bylaws, the court found that the
NFL "failed to demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm's-length
negotiations" between the NFL and its players union. 13
After concluding that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not ap-
ply, the court moved on to an antitrust analysis of the NFL's eligibil-
ity rule. Although Clarett alleged a group boycott, normally consid-
ered a per se violation, the court applied the rule of reason "because
the challenged restraint arises in the context of a sports league."" 4
Rather than use the traditional rule of reason, however, the court ap-
plied a "quick look" analysis because of the rule's obvious anticom-
petitive effects." 5 The court followed the Supreme Court's determina-
tion that a quick look "is appropriate where 'the great likelihood of
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained,' and 'an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive ef-
fect.""'16 The court found that Clarett established a prima facie anti-
trust violation because of the eligibility rule's "anticompetitive effect
of excluding players" from the NFL." 
7
The NFL offered four pro-competitive justifications, none of
which the court accepted as reasonable justifications under the anti-
trust laws. First, the NFL claimed that the rule protected less physi-
cally and psychologically mature athletes from heightened risks of
injury." 8 Second, the NFL cited its goal of protecting the NFL's en-
tertainment product from the adverse consequences of such inju-
ries.'1 9 Third, the NFL wanted to protect its teams from the costs and
liabilities associated with those injuries.120 Finally, the NFL claimed
that the rule protected adolescents from injury and self-abuse associ-
ated with the use of steroids by those who seek to prematurely de-
M Id at 396.
1121d at 385.
13Id. at 396.
1141d. at 405.
"15Id. at 408.
116 d. at 407-08 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).
17Id. at 408.
1181d
119Id
120 Id
.
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velop the strength and speed required to play in the NFL.12' The court
rejected all of these justifications as having "nothing to do with pro-
moting competition." Even if the NFL had presented a pro-
competitive justification, the court mentioned that there are less re-
strictive alternatives that satisfy the NFL's chief concern that younger
players are not mentally or physically ready to play in the NFL.
23
Therefore, the NFL's eligibility rule constituted an unreasonable re-
straint of trade.
B. The Second Circuit Punts the District Court's Decision
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the nonstatutory labor
exemption applied and shielded the rule from antitrust scrutiny. The
court stated that it "never regarded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey
as defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption."'
' 24
The court instead relied on its decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and
Wood to determine that the nonstatutory labor exemption applied to
the NFL's eligibility rule. 25 The court also looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown, which relied on similar reasoning in ap-
plying the nonstatutory labor exemption. 2 6 The court regarded its
own prior decisions as controlling authority because they "fully com-
port-in approach and result-with the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown."1
27
The Second Circuit began with the threshold question it raised in
Wood: "whether subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust
scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental principles of our federal labor
policy.""' 128 The court answered that question affirmatively, applying
the nonstatutory labor exemption for several reasons. First, the court
examined the collective bargaining relationship between the NFL and
its players union and noted, as it had in its previous cases, that the
relationship altered the "governing legal regime" between the parties.
Further, the terms and conditions of employment were committed to
the bargaining table, with negotiation reserved to representatives of
the league and its union. 29
1
2 1 ld.
122 Id.
123Id at 410.
124 Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
'
25 1d. at 134-35.
126d. at 135.
121d. at 138.
1281d (quoting Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
129 1d. at 137-39.
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Second, the court found that the eligibility rules were a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. First, the eligibility rules represented
a "literal condition for initial employment."'130 Second, the rules "have
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current NFL
players."' 3 1 In determining this, the court analyzed the complex
scheme of NFL salaries and how that scheme is based on the restraint
for entering players and the expected longevity of NFL players., 32 As
a result, the court looked at the eligibility rules in light of the other
collectively bargained-for terms regarding wages and working condi-
tions and concluded that elimination of the rules "might well alter
certain assumptions underlying the collective bargaining agree-
ment."' 3 3 The court based this conclusion on the relationship between
the eligibility rules and the rest of the bargaining agreement. Finally,
the court noted that the eligibility rules afforded job security to vet-
eran players, and that preservation of jobs is within union concern.' 34
The Second Circuit rejected Clarett's claim that the eligibility rules
were impermissible bargaining subjects because they affected players
outside of the union. The court compared Clarett's situation to "union
demands for hiring hall arrangements that have long been recognized
as mandatory subjects of bargaining.' 35 In this sense, the NFL and its
players union have the authority to determine the conditions under
which prospective players, such as Clarett, will be considered for
employment.
36
Clarett argued that the rules were arbitrary and did not relate to his
ability to play professional football. The court, however, found that
Clarett's situation did not differ from a worker who lacks the basic
requirements for employment.137 The court further stated that the NFL
and its union "can agree that an employee will not be hired or consid-
ered for employment for nearly any reason whatsoever, so long as
they do not violate federal [labor] laws."' 138
Clarett also argued that the NFL teams violated antitrust law by
agreeing amongst themselves to impose the eligibility restrictions. In
rejecting this argument, the court examined the relationship between
the NFL and concluded that in the context of collective bargaining,
labor law permits the NFL teams to act "as a multi-employer bargain-
1301d. at 139.
13 Id. at 140.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135Id. at 140-41.
1361d. at 141.
137Id.
1381d.
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ing unit in structuring the rules of play and setting the criteria for
player employment."' 139 In professional sports, this form of bargaining
offers the advantage of allowing teams to agree with one another and
then collectively bargain with the union over the rules and require-
ments of the association. 140 The Second Circuit concluded by noting
that even though the eligibility rules were not expressed within the
bargaining agreement, the agreement made clear reference to the rules
and the union knew of their existence in the NFL's Constitution and
Bylaws. 14 1 The rules were a mandatory bargaining subject and either
the union or the NFL could have forced the other side to bargain if
they desired a change. 142 Consequently, the court determined that the
rules were part of the CBA and fell under the protection of the non-
statutory labor exemption. 1
43
IV. THE NBA's MINIMUM AGE LIMIT UNDER ANTIRUST LAW AND
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION
"I would say [union director] Billy Hunter made a smart move if he
did indeed raise it. ",144
- Spencer Haywood
Heading into the negotiations for the new CBA, NBA Commis-
sioner David Stem advocated setting a minimum age limit of twenty-
years-old for players wishing to enter the NBA draft. 14 5 Stem cited a
desire to protect younger players, stating that "there are going to be
more difficult times for kids as more and more come."' 146 Meanwhile,
the NBPA's executive director, Billy Hunter, emphatically pro-
claimed the union to be "adamantly against an age limit" and "hold-
ing the line" for recent high school graduates eager to enter the NBA
draft. 147 Some within the union, however, supported an age limit, in-
cluding vice president and NBA player Antonio Davis. Davis voiced
his support for an age limit based on seeing "[players] needing matur-
ity, [players] needing some years to learn professionalism."' 148 Even
Spencer Haywood, the man responsible for the successful challenge
139Id.
140 Id.
41 Ild. at 142.
142 Id.
'43 Id.
'"Haywood: Age Limit 'Would Give Players Time To Mature,' ESPN.CoM, May 13,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.corn/nba/news/story?id=2059767 [hereinafter Haywood].
145 Katz, supra note 2; Lee, supra note 5.
146 Lee, supra note 5.
147 Katz, supra note 2.
148 Bulls Forward Davis Supports an Age Limit, SEATTLE TIMEs, Apr. 9, 2004, at D8.
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against the NBA's eligibility requirements thirty years earlier, ex-
pressed his support for an increased age limit.
49
During negotiations, Hunter asserted that he opposed the increased
age limit, but also expressed his flexibility "on anything if it makes
economic sense and improves the overall conditions for my constitu-
ents."' 15 In the end, the new CBA contained an age limit of nineteen,
or one year removed from high school graduation. This requirement
was less than what Stem sought but more than what Hunter appeared
willing to accept.151 In addition to the age limit, the NBA and NBPA
traded concessions relating to pensions and benefits, contract lengths,
salary increases, revenue sharing, roster sizes, and harsher drug penal-
ties. 152 The age limit, however, sparked the most discussion and is the
only provision likely to face an antitrust challenge.1
53
A. Antitrust Liability
1. Rule of Reason, Per Se, or Quick Look?
While the Denver Rockets case provides some insight into a possi-
ble antitrust challenge to the NBA's minimum age limit, that decision
occurred before the Supreme Court recognized that restraints in cer-
tain industries, such as sports leagues, should not be considered per se
violations of the Sherman Act. Although group boycotts or concerted
refusals to deal are normally per se violations, the NBA's age limit
would likely be scrutinized under the rule of reason, in light of the
NCAA decision. Like all sports leagues, the NBA requires cooperation
between the competing teams composing the league in order to exist.
The special characteristics of the NBA, as with the NCAA and other
sports leagues, justify looking at otherwise per se violations under the
rule of reason.
154
The NBA would face the same difficulties encountered by the
NFL at the district court level in Clarett if the minimum age limit
underwent rule of reason scrutiny. The district court in Clarett used
the quick look analysis because the anticompetitive effects of the
149 Haywood, supra note 144.
150 Hunter Still Philosophically Opposed to Raising NBA Age Limit, ESPN.cOM, May 12,
2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nba&id=2059082.
151NBA Reaches New Six-Year Labor Agreement with Higher Age Limit and Salary Cap,
ESPN.coM, June 22, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section--nba&id=2092030.
52Id.
153 Chad Ford, Contract Length a Deal Breaker?, ESPN.COM, May 20, 2005,
http://insider.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=ford chad&id=2062067&num= ("If
the league does institute such a rule, it likely will be challenged in court.").
"4See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); BORK, supra
note 22, at 278.
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NFL's eligibility rule were obvious (it excluded players from the
league). The NBA minimum age limit has the same exclusionary ef-
fect and a court may similarly rely on the quick look analysis.
There is no dispute that the NBA teams worked together to bargain
for and implement the minimum age limit. A plaintiff would also be
able to prove that the NBA has market power in regard to services for
basketball players within the United States. There are no other
leagues in direct competition with the NBA, and even international
leagues can be characterized as a different market because of the infe-
rior quality of the athletes and the inherent lower salaries. 5 5 The out-
come of a rule of reason or quick look analysis would rest on whether
the NBA can provide pro-competitive justifications for the age limit
that outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
2. Reasonableness of the Rule
The NFL's justifications for its eligibility rule in Clarett focused
on protecting the league's product, preventing injuries to its players
and the associated costs to the teams, and protecting adolescents who
may turn to dangerous performance enhancing drugs to prematurely
develop the strength and speed necessary for the league. The court
rejected these reasons because they did not promote competition and
there were less restrictive means available for protecting the health of
young players.' 56 Similarly, the Denver Rockets court discussed and
rejected the NBA's justifications for its eligibility rules. The league
stated that it needed the rule to function financially and that the rule
gave each player the opportunity to attend four years of college.
157
Haywood argued that the rule gave the NBA an efficient and inexpen-
sive minor league system in the form of college basketball. 58 The
court rejected these arguments in terms of their justifying an exemp-
tion to antitrust scrutiny, but did not examine them as part of a rule of
reason pro-/anti-competitive balancing test.
When discussing the current age limit, Commissioner Stern
mentioned his desire to keep the general managers of NBA teams out
of high school gymnasiums. Stem stated his concern for the youth
who dream of being basketball players rather than doctors and focus
their attention only on basketball, even though the likelihood of
155 See McCann, supra note 5, at 214-15 (discussing the difference in salaries between
leagues and concluding "the NBA has a global monopoly on premier professional basketball").
156 Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, vacated in part,
369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
157 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1066 (D. Cal. 1971).
158 Id.
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actually making the NBA is extremely low. 159 As the Clarett court
stated, concerns for the welfare of players and adolescents alone do
not suffice as pro-competitive justifications.160 To suffice, proffered
justifications must show that, on balance, "the challenged restraint
enhances competition."'
' 6
'
Without a pro-competitive justification, the NBA would not be
able to show justifications for the age limit that outweigh its anti-
competitive effects. The NBA may have a difficult time demonstrat-
ing any pro-competitive justifications based on protecting the finan-
cial stability and integrity of the league. The league experienced fi-
nancial growth during the recent period in which an increased number
of players entered the league straight out of high school.162 The best
evidence that a plaintiff may have in rebutting the NBA's justifica-
tions is the success and growth of the NBA during the past ten years,
the period when the largest number of players have entered the league
straight out of high school.
The success, both professionally and financially, of some of the
current players in the NBA who came directly out of high school also
weakens the NBA's justifications. Many of the justifications put forth
by the NFL in Clarett are not applicable in the NBA, as the history of
players coming directly out of high school does not indicate that they
are more injury prone than older players. It is true, however, that few
of the players who entered the NBA at eighteen were initially able to
compete at the same level as other players. Most took several years to
develop both mentally and physically, while others were unable to
maintain employment within the league. 163 This may provide the
NBA with a pro-competitive justification for the rule: as a result of
NBA teams having limited roster space and financial flexibility, it
may hurt competition to have teams use roster space on younger play-
ers who are currently unable to compete at the necessary level but
whose teams are hoping will eventually develop into quality players.
If a team lacks the talent to win games, it may not be able to attract
fans or make money, resulting in that team's folding or relocating,
which may harm competition in the league. This argument supports
159 Lee, supra note 5.
160See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408 ("While these may be reasonable concerns, none are
reasonable justifications under the antitrust laws.").
61 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
162 Ford, supra note 153 ("The NBA is in better financial shape than it was before the cur-
rent 1999 CBA kicked in."); Sekou Smith, Stern Expects NBA To Land in Europe; Commis-
sioner Who Helped Revive Leagu's Fortunes Thinks Teams Overseas Are Next Step,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 25, 2004, at 5D.
163 Mark Murphy, Basketball; NBA Preview 2005-06; The Young and the Restless; High
Schoolers Find the Going Tough at the NBA Level, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 2, 2005, at 80.
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the rationale that the age limit maintains a level of competition within
the league necessary for NBA teams to survive and thereby enhances
or protects the NBA and its entertainment product.
Despite this possible pro-competitive justification, it is more likely
that the NBA's minimum age limit would not survive antitrust scru-
tiny. Courts have rejected similar antitrust claims against professional
sports organizations.' 64 Given the recent success of players who
would now be prohibited from playing, the league would have an
even more difficult time proving that the age limit promotes competi-
tion. Fortunately for the NBA, the nonstatutory labor exemption pre-
vents the intrusion of antitrust law into the collective bargaining rela-
tionship.
B. The Applicability of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
1. The Mackey Test
To qualify for the nonstatutory labor exemption under Mackey, the
NBA's minimum age limit must meet three requirements. First, it
must primarily affect only the parties to the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. Second, it must be a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining. Finally, it must be a product of bona fide arm's-length bar-
gaining. The NBA's minimum age limit satisfies all of these
conditions.
a. Parties to the Collective Bargaining Relationship
The most contentious questions surrounding Mackey's application
to the NBA's age limit are whether the requirement primarily affects
parties to the agreement and whether it is a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining. Potential NBA players are considered parties to the NBA and
NBPA's bargaining relationship. Several courts have interpreted the
term "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act to include
potential employees or job applicants as members of the bargaining
unit. 1 65 The Supreme Court stated that following the creation of a
164See Claret, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09; Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 1049 (D. Cal. 1971).
165 See Reliance Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that job applicants
are employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)); Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264
F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959) (finding that job applicants are employees); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (finding that job applicants are employ-
ees); Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 409, 412,
enforced, 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965) ("''[E]mployment' connotes the initial act of employing
as well as the consequent state of being employed."); see also McCann, supra note 5, at 197-98
(discussing how courts interpret "employee" to include potential employees in the bargaining
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CBA, when a potential employee is hired, "the terms of the employ-
ment already have been traded out.', 166 The "duty to bargain is a con-
tinuing one" and, as a result, "a union may legitimately bargain over
wages and conditions of employment which will affect employees
,167who are to be hired in the future." Conversely, the Clarett district
court stated that Clarett could not be considered part of the bargaining
unit because the NFL's eligibility rule effectively excluded him from
employment. 168 This contradicted the Second Circuit's judgment in
Wood that the NBA's entry draft provision affected "only the parties
to the CBA-the NBA and the players.' ' 169 The Clarett district court,
however, conceded that "[t]here is no dispute that collective bargain-
ing agreements, and therefore the nonstatutory labor exemption, apply
to both prospective and current employees."'' 70 The court also con-
cluded that the NBPA and unions in general have an interest in pre-
serving jobs for union members and "can seek to preserve jobs for
current players to the detriment of new employees and the exclusion
of outsiders."' 7' Consequently, the NBA and NBPA are authorized to
negotiate the terms and conditions that will affect future players,
players who are at the time of bargaining classified as potential em-
ployees. This authority extends to the requirements for employment
and entry into the NBA. The effect of this duty and authority is that,
contrary to the assessment of the Clarett district court, eligibility re-
quirements primarily affect parties to the CBA.
b. Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
The minimum age limit is a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining because it pertains to the wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment in the NBA. The Supreme Court stated that
mandatory subjects include "issues that settle an aspect of the rela-
tionship between the employer and employees" and that a matter is a
mandatory subject depending on whether it vitally affects the "terms
unit and how collective bargaining is allowed to adversely affect the employment conditions of
prospective employees).
166 J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).
167 NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966)
("To the extent that application forms, used in hiring new employees in the future, contain
questions the answers to which affect conditions of employment, the union is entitled to bargain
with respect thereto.").
168Clarettv. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y.),rev'd in part, vacated in part, 369
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
169 Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.
1987).
170 Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
171 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
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and conditions" of employment. 72 Courts have interpreted this to
mean that a subject is mandatory if it affects wages, hours, and terms
or conditions of employment. 173 As the Mackey court stated,
"[w]hether an agreement concerns a mandatory subject depends not
on its form but on its practical effect. 1 74 The NBA's age limit, like
the eligibility rule in Clarett, represents "a quite literal condition for
initial employment and for that reason alone might constitute a man-
datory bargaining subject."'175 As with the NFL and its players union,
the NBA and the NBPA are responsible for setting the conditions
under which a prospective player is considered for employment. This
dictates that the age limit is a mandatory subject, because "[i]n accor-
dance with the literal language of the Labor Act, the parties must bar-
gain about the requirements or 'conditions' of initial employment.'
76
The age limit also affects the wages of players. Commentators
have suggested that NBA players stand to lose money by coming into
the league at an older age as a result of the structure of the league's
contracts, rookie salary scale, and free agency system. 177 These com-
mentators contend that no matter how long a player plays in the
league, he will not have the same opportunity for "maximum con-
tracts" by coming into the league a year later than previously possi-
ble. 178 Numerous aspects of the NBA's bargaining agreement, includ-
ing contract lengths and annual salary increases, rookie wage scale,
roster size, and salary caps may be directly affected by the age
limit.179 The minimum age limit is therefore a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
c. Bona Fide Arm 's-Length Bargaining
There should be little debating that the age limit arose from bona
fide arm's-length bargaining. The statements made by both the NBPA
172 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 178-79 (1971).
173 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976); Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
174 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
175 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
176d. at 140 (citing R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 504 (1976)).
177 See McCann, supra note 5, at 169-72 (illustrating how entering the league at different
ages directly affects the earning capacity of NBA players); Katz, supra note 2 ("The consensus
is that a player who comes into the league as a teenager has a chance to get two seven-year
maximum contracts before he turns 36 when the cap starts to be affected. But a player who
comes into the league in his 20s might only have one chance.").
178 See McCann, supra note 5, at 169-72; Katz, supra note 2.
179 See Clarett 369 F.3d at 140 (finding that NFL's eligibility rule affected wages because
the complex scheme of salaries, the salary cap, free agency, and the rookie wage scale, among
other things, were based on the presence of the age requirement).
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director and NBA Commissioner indicate that the parties differed on
the necessity of the age limit prior to and throughout the negotiations
but eventually compromised. There is also evidence that the two sides
engaged in the trading of concessions, and a case could likely be pre-
sented that the NBPA only agreed to the age limit after the NBA
compromised on other contentious issues, thereby trading concessions
quid pro quo.
2. The Second Circuit's Approach to the Age Limit
The NBA's age limit meets the Second Circuit's criteria for the
nonstatutory labor exemption. It is more deserving of protection from
antitrust scrutiny than the eligibility rule in Clarett. The court in
Wood, Caldwell, and Clarett determined that rules similar to the
NBA's minimum age limit are proper subjects of bargaining and
therefore protected from antitrust liability.
Analysis of the NBA's minimum age limit mirrors that of the
NBA's entry draft provision in Wood and the NFL's eligibility rule in
Clarett. The conditions under which prospective players are consid-
ered for NBA employment are terms for the NBA and NBPA to de-
termine. As with the eligibility provisions in Wood and Clarett, the
NBA's age limit is a mandatory subject of bargaining as a "literal
condition for initial employment."'' 80 The Second Circuit also deter-
mined that eligibility rules have tangible effects on the wages and
working conditions of players in the league, including increasing job
security for veteran players.18' The NBA's rule, like its NFL counter-
part, is central to the bargaining agreement and eliminating the rule
may alter assumptions underlying the CBA and adversely affect its
other terms and conditions.
The Wood and Clarett decisions discussed challenges to the proce-
dures for entry into sports leagues. In both cases, the court adopted
the position that the term "employee" under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act includes potential employees and job applicants. 82 The
court also stated that unions can act to protect constituents and favor
senior employees to the detriment of the less tenured and potential
employees. 83 As a result, potential NBA players are considered par-
ties to the bargaining relationship.
The NBA's age limit is included within the CBA and is the prod-
uct of negotiations between the NBA and NBPA. This is in contrast to
19o Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
181 Id. at 140.
1
8 2 Id. at 140-41; Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987).
183 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
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the NFL's rule in Clarett, which met the criteria of being bargained
for even though it existed only in the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.
Public and private statements indicate that the NBA and NBPA nego-
tiated the imposition of the age limit and the actual minimum age.
184
The issue of entry into the NBA is at the center of collective bar-
gaining. The agreement between the NBA and NBPA is a bundle of
compromises geared to achieving solutions to problems and issues
unique to the sports industry generally and the NBA specifically.
85
The minimum age limit is but one negotiated solution to one problem
and allowing an antitrust court to strike that provision could unravel
the entire agreement. The nonstatutory labor exemption applies be-
cause, in the words of the Second Circuit, subjecting the NBA's
minimum age limit "to antitrust scrutiny would 'subvert fundamental
principles of our federal labor policy.""
'186
3. The Age Limit Examined Under Brown v. Pro Football
The NBA's minimum age limit qualifies for the nonstatutory labor
exemption under the Supreme Court's reasoning in Brown. Brown
stressed the importance of the collective bargaining relationship and
protecting that relationship from judicial antitrust scrutiny. The crea-
tion of the NBA's minimum age limit paralleled the creation of the
NFL's rule at issue in Brown. The age limit resulted from the collec-
tive bargaining negotiations between the NBA and the NBPA and is
embodied in the CBA. The public statements made by representatives
of the NBA and NBPA indicate that the two sides did not originally
agree on the issue of an increased age limit and negotiated the issue at
arm's length, perhaps even trading concessions quid pro quo.1
8 7
The Brown court mentioned that the exemption does not cover all
joint imposition of terms by employers, as some may be so far re-
moved from the collective bargaining relationship that antitrust inter-
vention would not interfere with that relationship. 88 This, however, is
not the case with the NBA's age limit. It arose from the negotiations
between the NBA and NBPA relating to the current CBA. It is highly
probable that many other elements of the bargaining agreement, such
as the league's yearly salary increases, rookie wage scale, contract
length, and salary cap, were based on the existence of the new age
184 See supra notes 157-53 and accompanying text.
185 See Wood, 809 F.2d at 961 ("The NBA/NBPA agreement is just such a unique bundle
of compromises.").186 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (citing Wood, 809 F.2d at 959).
187 See supra Part IV; supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
188 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
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limit. The age limit is so closely tied to these other provisions that
antitrust intervention would adversely affect the entire agreement.
While the Supreme Court in Brown declined to draw a line be-
tween what is and what is not covered by the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption, it did mention aspects of the NFL's conduct that justified its
application. The Court noted that the NFL's conduct occurred during
and immediately following negotiations within a lawful bargaining
process, concerned a proper subject for collective bargaining, and
concerned only parties to the bargaining relationship.' 89 As illustrated
previously, all of these characteristics are also true of the NBA's
minimum age limit. This supports the argument that the nonstatutory
labor exemption applies to the NBA's bargaining relationship and the
minimum age limit.
C. The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Should Protect the NBA 's
Minimum Age Limit from Antitrust Scrutiny
In addition to the factual reasons set forth, there are legal and prac-
tical considerations supporting the application of the nonstatutory
labor exemption to the NBA's minimum age limit. The purpose of the
exemption is to allow for meaningful collective bargaining by shield-
ing from antitrust scrutiny some restraints that arise from bargain-
ing. 190 The NBA and NBPA cannot engage in successful future nego-
tiations if they are concerned that potential restraints arising from
those negotiations are subject to antitrust review. Submitting the
NBA's minimum age limit to antitrust scrutiny would introduce in-
stability and uncertainty to the NBA and NBPA's bargaining relation-
ship and potentially unravel the NBA's entire CBA. Allowing a court
to alter the minimum age limit, an important provision of the bargain-
ing agreement, would undermine the agreement's other provisions
that are based on that limit.'9 '
To allow antitrust laws to intrude on the collective bargaining rela-
tionship between the NBA and NBPA would substitute the judgment
of a court for that of the negotiating parties. Doing so would jeopard-
ize the potentially beneficial labor-related effects that the relationship
exists to achieve. The Supreme Court indicated its reluctance to do so
without the detailed views of the National Labor Relations Board,
noting Congressional intent to defer to the NLRB's 'specialized
189 Id.
190Id. at 237.
19' See Wood, 809 F.2d at 961 (stating that "one cannot alter important provisions of a col-
lective agreement without undermining other provisions").
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judgment' in such situations. 92 The NBA's minimum age limit is
one aspect of the CBA between the NBA and NBPA. The agreement
itself represents a bundle of compromises geared to achieving solu-
tions to problems and issues that are unique to the sports industry
generally and the NBA specifically. 193 Professional sports leagues
require rules and restraints on competition in order to exist. The his-
tory of the NBA and other sports leagues illustrates the tenuous nature
of the business, as teams often relocate because of the difficulties
associated with generating the revenue stream necessary to support a
team. Allowing a court to change the age of eligible players could
affect the economic and financial models on which players' salaries,
contracts, and other terms of employment are based. Because the pro-
visions of the bargaining agreement are intended to promote competi-
tive and economic balance within the league and to maintain the vi-
ability of the league and its teams, scrutinizing and nullifying
fundamental provisions may harm competition within the league and
the financial well-being of teams, players, and the NBA.
Many professions and occupations require that potential employ-
ees possess a certain educational level or skill set obtained through a
training or certification program. These requirements may be industry
imposed or statutory, such as age requirements for inherently danger-
ous industries. An amateur basketball player who does not meet the
minimum age limit to enter the NBA draft is no different than a law-
yer who has not been certified by the relevant bar association. 94 The
NBA's age limit could, in effect, be viewed as requiring potential
players to undergo a year of post-high school basketball training. It is
feasible that a player could choose not to play organized basketball
between high school graduation and becoming eligible for the draft;
with the options available for a basketball player with legitimate NBA
potential coming out of high school, however, sitting out of organized
basketball is an unlikely scenario.' 95 The track record of players enter-
ing the NBA directly from high school supports a requirement that
players receive some additional training before entering the league.
Most players in this category struggled to play at a competitive level
192 Brown, 518 U.S. at 250 (citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S.
87, 96 (1957)).
193 Wood, 809 F.2d at 961.
194See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Clarett is in this respect no dif-
ferent from the typical worker who is confident that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy
but does not possess the qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have been set.").
195 The most likely and prudent choice for a high school player pursuing an NBA dream is
college basketball. There are also numerous leagues overseas and alternative professional bas-
ketball leagues in the United States, including the Continental Basketball Association and the
American Basketball Association.
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during their first two or three years in the league, with a few notable
exceptions. 196 Even Kobe Bryant, currently among the best players in
the NBA, failed to earn significant playing time until his third and
fourth seasons. 1
97
The issue of entry into the NBA is of tremendous importance and a
vital aspect of collective bargaining. Eligibility rules are one method
by which the NBA spreads talent among teams to maintain competi-
tive balance within the league, thereby maintaining the viability of the
league by enhancing competition among the teams and creating a
product that attracts fans. The age limit allows teams to scout poten-
tial players at the college level, providing the opportunity to see play-
ers competing against a higher level of competition than in high
schools. The NBA has limited space for players and the minimum age
limit is one of the NBA's tools to ensure that the league gets the best
players for the few available positions. The number of teams must be
limited in order to ensure the success of the teams and league. The
number of roster positions on a team is limited in order to control the
costs associated with fielding a team and because the nature and rules
of the game restrict the amount of playing time available during the
season. Playing in the NBA is a privilege, not a right, and the players
union is allowed "to preserve jobs for current players to the detriment
of new employees and the exclusion of outsiders." 198
Finally, disputes arising out of collective bargaining are the do-
main of labor law, not antitrust law. Labor law provides remedies for
those injured by collective bargaining, including claims of discrimina-
tory or other illegal hiring practices. One objective of labor law is the
removal "from antitrust courts the authority to determine, through
application of the antitrust laws, what is socially or economically de-
sirable collective-bargaining policy."' 199 The National Labor Relations
Board is responsible for monitoring the bargaining process. Labor law
"substitutes legislative and administrative labor-related determina-
tions for judicial antitrust-related determinations as to the . . .legal
limits of' collective bargaining.200 Allowing antitrust courts to deter-
mine what is acceptable bargaining is detrimental because prohibiting
particular solutions designed for particular problems reduces the
number and quality of compromises available to unions and employ-
196 Murphy, supra note 163 (citing Amare Stoudemire and LeBron James).
1971d. Another All-Star, Jermaine O'Neal, had a similar experience, as he did not get sig-
nificant playing time until his fifth season after being traded by the team that drafted him. Id.
98 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
199 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231,242 (1996).
200Id. at 237.
[Vol. 56:3
THE NBA GETS A COLLEGE EDUCATION
ers for resolving their differences. 20 1 Labor law, not antitrust law, is
the province for claims brought by potential employees dissatisfied
with the requirements for employment established by an employer
and union.202 For example, claims arising from perceived unfair bar-
gaining behavior must be pursued under an unfair labor practice
claim, not the Sherman Act.20 3 Likewise, the "proper action" for a
claim that the age limit "might be illegal because of discrimination
against new employees (players)" is under labor law. °4 Because labor
law provides the protections and remedies for those injured by collec-
tive bargaining, the NBA's age limit should be shielded from antitrust
scrutiny by the nonstatutory labor exemption.
CONCLUSION
The flood of players entering the NBA straight out of high school
prompted the league to institute a new minimum age limit of nine-
teen. No matter whether the age limit is perceived as necessary or not,
it is embodied within the CBA and arose out of the negotiations be-
tween the NBA and NBPA. An antitrust challenge to the NBA's
minimum age limit would not be the first time the league faced such a
challenge. Both the NBA and NFL have confronted similar chal-
lenges to eligibility provisions and triumphed as a result of the non-
statutory labor exemption.
The nonstatutory labor exemption provides protection to practices
and policies arising from a bargaining relationship that may otherwise
qualify as illegal restraints of trade in violation of antitrust laws. If
subjected to antitrust scrutiny, a court is likely to invalidate the
NBA's minimum age limit, because it does indeed restrain trade and
lacks sufficient pro-competitive justifications. The age limit, how-
ever, should be protected from antitrust scrutiny by the nonstatutory
labor exemption. It arose out of the bargaining relationship, applies
primarily to parties to that relationship, is embodied in the bargaining
agreement, is a mandatory subject of bargaining because it relates to
wages and is a literal condition for employment, and is the product of
negotiation and arm's-length bargaining between the NBA and
NBPA. The nonstatutory labor exemption therefore applies no matter
which method a court utilizes to determine the applicability of the
exemption. Based on previous cases dealing with the nonstatutory
labor exemption and professional sports leagues, the application of
201 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (citing Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987)).
2021d. at 143.
203 Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 n.5.
204 Id. at 962.
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the exemption to the NBA's minimum age limit should face as little
opposition as a free throw.
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